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Abstract:  We  run  a  large  field  experiment  with  an  online  company  specializing  in  selling  used 
automobiles via ascending auctions.   We manipulate experimentally the maximum amount which bidders 
can bid above the current standing price, thus affecting the ease with which bidders can engage in jump 
bidding.   We test between the intimidation vs. costly bidding hypotheses of jump bidding by looking at 
the effect of these jump-bidding restrictions on average seller revenue.   We find evidence consistent with 
costly bidding in one market (Texas), but intimidation in the other market (New York).  This difference in 
findings between the two markets appears partly attributable to the more prominent presence of sellers 
who are car dealers in the Texas market. 
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1.  Introduction 
The development and application of auction theory has been one of the most prominent 
achievements in economics over the last few decades (at least since Vickrey, 1961).  For book 
length treatments of auction theory see Milgrom (2004) and Krishna (2002).  Along with 
theoretical literature there has been a growing empirical literature on auctions (for surveys see 
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) and Hendricks and Porter (2007)).  In this paper we report the 
results of a large scale field experiment in which a major firm in online automobile auctions 
allowed us to change some of the parameters of the auctions.  
In these experiments we introduce manipulations to test theories of why bidders engage in jump 
bidding – that is, why bidders choose to submit a bid which exceeds the minimum bidding 
increment.   Jump bidding is an endemic feature of real-world ascending (―English‖) auctions; 
this includes the famous FCC wireless spectrum auctions
2 which the US government has been 
running regularly for almost twenty years, online (eBay) auctions, and also conventional art and 
antiquities auctions run by Sotheby's and Christies for hundreds of years.   At the same time, 
jump bidding has also been observed in many experimental implementations of ascending 
auctions (McCabe et. al. (1990), Banks et al. (2003), Coppinger et al. (1980) and Lucking-Reiley 
(1999)).    
The prevalence of jump-bidding presents a puzzle for standard auction theory.   In the 
independent private values (IPV) setting, researchers have long recognized the strategic 
equivalence of ascending and second-price (Vickrey) auctions; to wit, the celebrated bidding 
outcome in second-price auctions – that it is a dominant strategy for bidders to bid their true 
valuations (Vickrey (1961), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Milgrom and Weber (1982))– can be 
translated into an analogous strategy for ascending auctions: bidders should stay active in the 
auction by submitting bids just marginally above the standing bid, until the standing bid 
surpasses their true valuations.   As mentioned above however, observed bidding behavior 
deviates substantially from this ―straightforward bidding‖ benchmark, due mainly to anomalous 
                                                       
2   See Isaac, Salmon and Zillante (2007), Plott and Salmon (2004) and Cramton (1997) for details 
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jump-bidding.   As a result, there is a small but growing theoretical literature to explain jump 
bidding.   In this paper, we attempt to discriminate between these theories by executing a number 
of field experiments in which we manipulate the ease with which bidders can jump-bid.  As far 




One standard model of English auctions – and one in which the equivalence between second-
price and English auctions holds in the independent private values setting – is the so-called 
―button‖ or clock auction (Milgrom and Weber (1982)), in which the price is set by a clock 
which rises automatically, and bidders indicate their willingness to pay the current price by 
holding down a button.   Once a bidder releases his button, however, he ―drops out‖ of the 
auction, and can no longer re-enter.    
While analytically attractive, this clock auction is, however, not the typical auction form used in 
practice.  In the typical ascending bid auction, there is no ―clock‖, and the price sequence forms 
endogenously, consisting of bid amounts which are chosen by the individual bidders; hence, at 
any moment during the auction, bidders can submit bids which exceed the minimum acceptable 
bid (that is, jump), instead of simply deciding whether to stay in or drop out at the current price.    
In this setup, there are two compelling explanations for jump bidding which have been 
emphasized in the literature.
4   First, bidders may jump in order to signal one's high valuation, 
and thereby eliminate competition by intimidating rivals.   Second, bidders may be impatient and 
face time costs of bidding, so that they jump in order to shorten the auction and, thereby, avoid 
the bidding costs.   
                                                       
3   Lucking-Reiley (1999), in his field experiments with Magic cards, did increase the bid increment 
size of higher priced cards at the request of bidders.  However, this was not a systematic treatment in his 
study. 
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These two explanations have different implications on seller revenue, which forms the basic 
premise for our empirical work below.   Intuitively, intimidative jump bidding benefits buyers by 
reducing competition, which will lower seller revenue.   On the other hand, when bidders are 
impatient, opportunities to end the auction sooner by jump bidding should, all else equal, not 
change the allocation of the auction, but raises bidders' willingness-to-pay, thus enhancing seller 
revenue.    Next, we examine the intimidation and impatience hypotheses of jump bidding more 
closely. 
Jump-bidding for signalling and intimidation.  Avery (1998) constructs an equilibrium 
signaling model with jump bidding.   In a two-stage setting in which a preliminary jump-bidding 
stage is followed by a traditional open-exit ―clock‖ auction, Avery shows that there are a 
continuum of equilibria involving jump-bidding in which the seller's expected revenue is 
bounded above by the revenue in the straightforward equilibrium, which has no jump bidding.   
In this setting, the ability to jump-bid allows the competing bidders to coordinate on asymmetric 
strategies in the second-stage auction: a bidder with more favorable information, by jumping 
aggressively in the initial stage, signals his more favorable information and, at the same time, 
―selects‖ to play a more aggressive strategy in the second stage, and intimidates his rivals to 
adopt more passive bidding strategies in the second stage.  Importantly for our empirical 
analysis, the asymmetric equilibria selected by the jumping behavior Pareto-dominate the 
symmetric equilibrium, thus decreasing seller revenue on average.
5   
Jump-bidding to overcome impatience.   Another important explanation for jump bidding in the 
existing literature is that bidding in ascending auctions involves time costs which are absent in 
simultaneous sealed-bid auctions.  Several authors have introduced the idea of bidding costs that 
are incurred by all bidders, and which must be incurred for each submitted bid..   Bidding costs 
do seem plausible in many bidding environments, and can be motivated by bidders' cost of time 
or simple impatience.   For models in this vein, see Daniel and Hirschleifer (1997), Easley and 
                                                       
5  As Avery notes, this effect counteracts the ―linkage principle‖, whereby open auctions (such as 
the ascending auction) yield greater expected seller revenue than sealed-bid auctions, in an affiliated-
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Tenorio (2004), Hoerner and Sahuguet (2007), and Isaac, Salmon and Zillante (2007).   Time 
costs introduce a ―war of attrition‖ component to ascending auctions and, in such a setting, 
bidders benefit from the ability to jump-bid, because auctions end sooner. 
  Generally,  jump-bidding arising from bidder impatience or bidding costs tends to increase 
seller revenue.   Milgrom (2004, pp. 128-132) provides a version of this argument.   Essentially, 
any IPV auction, no matter whether bidding costs are present and no matter whether jumping is 
allowed, is payoff-equivalent to the standard sealed-bid second-price auction.  That is, the 
presence of bidding costs or the ability to jump-bid does not affect the equilibrium allocation of 
the object (which always goes to the bidder with the highest valuation), but only the equilibrium 
transfers (prices) paid by the bidders.   However, when bidding costs are present,  the ability to 
jump-bid increases the total surplus; because the auction can end sooner, costly bidding can be 
avoided.  Because seller revenue is the residual from total surplus minus bidders' payoff, then, it 
must be higher when jumping is allowed.
6  Correspondingly, both the costly bidding model in 
Daniel and Hirschleifer (1997) and the bidder impatience model in Isaac, Salmon and Zillante 
(2007) are characterized by higher seller revenues as bidders are allowed to submit jump bids 
and hence end the auction sooner.
7  Experimental evidence reported in Isaac, Salmon, and 
Zillante (2005) confirm that, indeed, revenues in ascending auctions fall when bidders are forced 
to bid straightforwardly (and not allowed to jump).
8 
This distinction between the revenue-enhancing versus revenue-decreasing effects of jump-
bidding is a crucial distinction between the impatience vs. intimidation explanations of jump-
bidding, and will be an important focus of our empirical analysis below.  Formally, the Avery 
and Milgrom models, which are the main models we consider here for, respectively, the 
                                                       
6  Obviously, we are assuming here that the seller is not impatient, and does not likely incur time 
costs proportional to the length of the auction. 
7  Indeed, certain features of eBay auctions, such as proxy bidding and the ―buy it now‖ option, can 
be interpreted as attempts by sellers to reduce bidding costs or shorten auction length which, accordingly, 
should lead to higher expected revenue.    
8     Also, Roberts and Sweeting (2010) describe a (non-auction) sequential bidding procedure 
in which revenues can increase when jump bidding is allowed. 6 
 
intimidation and costly bidding stories of jump bidding, differ in their informational 
assumptions: Avery assumes that bidders' valuations are affiliated, while Milgrom maintains an 
IPV assumption.   Hence, strictly speaking, testing between these two models is actually a joint 
test of  both IPV vs. affiliated values as well as intimidation vs. costly bidding.
9   Nevertheless, 
the competing hypotheses that intimidative bidding lowers seller revenue, while allowing 
impatient bidders to jump raises revenue, have intuitive appeal, and in what follows we will 
emphasize this distinction between the models rather than the differences in informational 
assumptions.. 
2. Field experiments: Used-car Auctions at copart.com 
The empirical importance of jump bidding, coupled with the contrasting revenue implications of 
some key explanations, call out for empirical work to determine the explanations for real-world 
jump-bidding behavior.  However, testing hypotheses about jump-bidding is difficult using field 
data, mainly due to data requirements.   In order to isolate jumps, the complete sequence of bids 
observed in an ascending auction must be recorded and available to the researcher.   However, in 
the majority of real-world ascending auctions, typically only the final bid submitted by each 
participating bidder is recorded, making such data inappropriate for testing theories of jump-
bidding.
10 
For these reasons, we design a set of unique field experiments
11 using an online ascending 
auction for automobiles, in order to evaluate the various explanations for jump-bidding described 
above.   Specifically, we created an experiment with Copart Inc., the largest auction house for 
salvage vehicles in the world.  In these auctions, we manipulated the ease with which bidders 
could engage in jump-bidding, by restricting the maximum amount of the bid that could be 
                                                       
9  Indeed, Raviv (2007) uses this distinction as the basis for a test of common vs. private values in 
open-outcry car auctions in New Jersey. 
10  This is true in typical data from online auction sites (such as eBay; see, e.g. Song (2004)), as well 
as from timber auctions run by the US Forest Service (Haile and Tamer (2003)).   See Athey and Haile 
(2002) for additional discussion of inferential difficulties with ascending auction data. 
11   See Harrison and List (2004) for a discussion on the use of field experiments. 7 
 
submitted above the current standing price.   Before describing our experimental design in detail, 
we begin with a description of Copart and its online auction mechanism. 
Copart sells well-over a million cars annually through its on-line virtual auction.  On average, 
each business day, Copart auctions around 5,000 vehicles on its site.  Copart is an intermediary 
that obtains the vehicles from finance companies, banks, dealers, fleets, rental car companies and 
the insurance industry.  Copart has over 150 facilities throughout the United States, Canada and 
the United Kingdom.  Buyers are from around world and auctions are conducted each business 
day at various Copart facilities.  Our experiments utilize Copart's largest auction yard (in 
Houston, Texas) and another geographically different yard in upstate New York to examine the 
effect of jump bidding restrictions on observed auction outcomes.   Given the large scale of the 
auctions run by Copart, any systematic effects of jump bidding on revenues is likely to be 
economically meaningful. 
We use data from 24 auctions – 13 run under the company's baseline parameters, and 11 run 
under altered parameters introduced by us. The volume varies across the sales, but each auction 
has approximately 500 vehicles offered for sale.   The scale of the experiment is comparable to 
that of the sequencing experiments with used car auctions reported in Grether and Plott (2009).  
Relatedly, Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2009), use field experiments with a used automobile auction 
company to explore how providing more information (in the form of  ―Standardized Condition 
Reports‖ describing a used car's condition) to bidders affects auction outcomes, particularly 
revenues. 
Copart Auctions: main  features 
Here we describe the important features of the ascending auctions run by Copart.  In order to 
participate, a buyer must first register an account to access the system.  Following this, the buyer 
will be able to access the ―current sales‖ button to view all of the auctions going on that day, the 
locations of the auctions, and the start times.  Buyers can join an auction at any time.   Buyers 
can also view vehicles in upcoming auctions.  Each auction shows pictures of the vehicle up for 8 
 
auction, its make, model and year, along with the list of details shown in Table 1.  Figure 1 
shows a typical auction screen from the Copart auction site. 
The car to be auctioned is called a lot and is sold sequentially in lanes at each facility called a 
yard.   Once the starting price is determined, the bid increment is set based on the current bid.  
Table 2 shows how the bid increments change during the course of an auction, depending on the 
level of the current (or ―standing‖) bid. 
Once the auction is underway, bidders can submit bids in real time that are equal to one of the 
following options: 
(i) the current bid plus the minimum increment; or  
(ii) the current bid plus 5 times the minimum increment; or 
(iii) the current bid plus 10 times the minimum increment. 
As shown in Figure 1, the buttons for the different bid choices available to the bidders are 
located prominently on the lower right-hand side of the bidder screen. 
Once a bidder submits one of these three bids it becomes the new standing bid and if no new 
standing bid is made in two seconds, then there is a five second count down displayed on the 
bidder screen. If no new standing bid is provided in those five seconds the auction ends. Thus, if 
no bid is received in seven seconds the auction is over. In our data the actual median time 
between bids is about one second with the average time approximately 2.5 seconds. The 
distribution of interbid times is bimodal with a large mode at zero (presumably the automatic 
increments for bidders with higher limit prices) and a second smaller mode at 7 seconds.  
Histograms of the distribution of interbid times for the New York and Texas yards are presented 
in, respectively, Figures 2 and 3. In some cases the time between bids exceeds seven seconds, but 
is never greater than eleven seconds. These longer intervals are caused by delays due to the 
online bidding environment.  9 
 
 In addition, Copart‘s auctions have two distinctive features..  First, for most lots offered for sale 
there is a secret reserve price
12; that is, a minimum bid which is unobserved to bidders at the 
time they choose their bids, such that if the highest bid in the auction falls below it, the seller has 
the option to not sell to the highest bidder.
13   Importantly, if the minimum bid is met during the 
course of the virtual auction, an announcement is made that the lot is ―sellin’ all the way‖. 
Second, if the bidding does not reach the reserve price the seller may negotiate with the high 
bidder or in some cases with the second highest bidder. Copart‘s new revised auction site 
specifically highlights this feature noting that bidders may engage in negotiations with sellers 
who ―reveal or eliminate their minimum bid requirement to speed up the final sale to you.‖   As 
we will see below, these aspects of the auction interact in interesting (and unforeseen) ways with 
the experimental jump-bidding manipulations in our field experiments. 
Experimental Design: interventions in bid increments 
The goal of our interventions in our field experiments was to change the ease with which bidders 
could jump-bid; that is, how easy it was for bidders to submit bids which were substantially 
larger than the current standing bid.   To wit, we manipulated the size of the jumps that bidders 
could choose when submitting their bid.  As we noted above, the standard Copart auction rules 
allow bidders to submit jump-bids which are either 5 or 10 times the bid increment above the 
current bid.   We call this the baseline treatment, and denote it by (1,5,10).   We introduced two 
contrasting treatments.   First, we have a limited jump-size treatment which restricts jump bids to 
only 2 or 3 times the bid increment above the current bid.  We denote this treatment by (1,2,3).  
Second, we have an enhanced jump-size treatment which allows bidders to bid 10 or 20 twenty 
                                                       
12   If there is no minimum bid required, this is listed as  a pure sale in the auction.  If there is a 
minimum bid required, it is always secret to the bidders (but they know that there is a reserve price on the 
lot). 
13  Secret reserve prices are actually commonly observed in real-world auctions, but not completely 
understood from an auction-theoretic point of view.   See Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Katkar and 
Reiley (2006) for empirical and experimental work exploring secret reserve prices, and Elyakime et 
al.(1994), Vincent (1995) for theoretical analyses. 10 
 
times the bid increment above the current bid.
14   In the enhanced (limited) jump-size treatment, 
it is easier (harder) for bidders to jump, in the sense that a desired bid level $X(>0) above the 
current standing bid is easier (harder) to achieve under the enhanced (limited) treatment than 
under the other treatments. 
Two Copart yards – in Houston, Texas and upstate New York -- were used in our study.  The 
Texas yard has greater volume with two sales per week while the New York yard and all the 
other company yards have weekly sales. The volume per sale varies, but averages around 500 
vehicles per sale. At both yards insurance companies are the owners of around 40% of the 
vehicles offered for sale. At the New York site, the other main sources of vehicles are 
governments and municipalities (20 %) and charities (18 %).  Notably, used car dealers account 
for only about 10% of sales in New York.  The seller mix at the Texas site, however, is quite 
different; dealers have the most prominent presence there, and account for 45% of the lots 
offered for sale.  Below, we will attribute some of the observed differences in seller behavior 
between the Texas and New York sales to these differences in seller populations between the two 
sites.    
Table 3 lists the sequence of our treatments by date and yard.  For each lot there is information 
about the item and summary bid data. The information on the lot includes the description (make, 
model year), damage including repair cost (seller‘s estimate), mileage, title type and state of 
registration and the number of times the lot has been previously auctioned. In our empirical work 
below, these are the main variables used to control for heterogeneity across lots. Information 
about the auction includes the minimum bid, the starting bid, number of bids and jump bids, the 
high bid, the selling price (listed as zero if the seller did not accept the price), the high bidder 
(coded) including the state and nationality of the high bidder and the seller‘s identity (coded) 
and, for some of the sales, the type of the seller. The final sale price may differ from the high bid 
as a result of negotiations between the seller and the first or second highest bidder. In addition, 
for teach lot we observe the complete sequence of bids and bidder identities, allowing us to 
                                                       
14  We had initially proposed a treatment that eliminated jumps completely (ie. ―(1,1,1)‖), but this 
was not feasible due to software limitations in Copart's online bidding system. 11 
 
determine accurately whether a bidder jumped (ie., submitted a bid more than one increment 
above the standing bid), and the amount of the jump. 
 
3.  Empirical results 
In this section we present and discuss the main findings from our field experiments.   As 
discussed above, our main goal going into the project was to test between two compelling 
explanations of jump-bidding in ascending auctions: signaling/intimidation vs. bidder 
impatience.   However, as will be apparent below, there were some additional features of the 
auction which we did not anticipate, and which end up playing an important role in interpreting 
the empirical results.   We begin with some discussion of general trends in the data, followed by 
a more specific regression-based analysis. 
Initial results 
Summary statistics for the two yards and the three treatment conditions are given in Table 4.  
First, we confirm that the treatments are effective in that the proportion of jumps in both the 
limited and enhanced jump-size treatments are significantly different from the proportions in the 
baseline (1,5,10) treatment. The observed treatment effects are sensible with the number of 
jumps increasing when the jump size is restricted, and falling when the jump size is increased.   
The actual number of jumps varies somewhat across the auction sites.  At the New York location 
approximately 1.3 percent of the bids are jumps with roughly six percent of the buyers jumping 
at least once. Jump bids are more frequent at the Texas site with about nine percent of the 
bidders jumping at least once and jump bids accounting for approximately 2.5 percent of the 
bids. These figures are consistent with jump bids being mistakes (for bidders who jump the 
modal number of jump bids is one).  
Second, looking at average price with the three treatments do not reveal any substantial revenue 
effects of changing the allowable jump sizes. The average high bid does not vary significantly 
nor does the average sale price (conditional on the vehicle being sold).  Moreover, the auctions in 12 
 
Texas take about twice as long as those at the New York yard, and the high bids are roughly 
twice those at New York. 
The proportion sold decreases at the Texas site when jumps are restricted and at the New York 
yard when the jumps are larger.   Thus, the overall revenue effects are ambiguous and not 
consistent across the two locations. Variation in the composition of the seller groups may 
account for some of these differences between the two sites. While insurance companies in our 
sample sell about 90-95 percent of their cars at auction, dealer sales rates are mainly in the 60 
percent range. The re-auctioning
15 of cars at the Texas site is about twice the rate observed at the 
New York site. Looking at the number of times a vehicle has been auctioned, the median is one 
in New York and two in Texas and the numbers are about double at the quartiles and, at the 99
th 
percentile: 7 for New York and 14 for Texas. 
Theories of strategic jump bidding often have equilibria with the bidding starting and ending 
with jump bids. In our data this does not happen. The fraction of first bids that are jumps is 
somewhat higher than the overall jump rates at both locations (0.022 in New York and 0.036 at 
the Texas site). At the New York site the proportion of final bids that are jumps is about the same 
(1.5 percent) as the overall proportion of jump bids. In Texas, final bids are more likely to be 
jumps with about 3.2% of the sales ending with jumps. At both locations the ‗winning bids‘ are 
likely to come from bidders who jumped at some time during the bidding on the lot.  In New 
York about 4 percent and in Texas 11 percent of the high bids were made by bidders who 
jumped during the auction on that lot-- quite modest numbers. 
Detour: Repeat-bidding.  Before moving on to regression results which show how robust these 
findings are to various controls, we discuss a particularly striking bidding phenomenon which we 
observed in Copart auctions, which appears anomalous at first glance – that of repeat bidding.
16   
We say that a buyer engages in repeat bidding when he/she submits two consecutive bids. Thus, 
repeat bidders are raising their own bids. These auctions move very fast with the typical lot 
                                                       
15  A re-auctioned lot is a lot that was previously offered in an earlier auction but not sold. 
16   In the history of the Copart auctions, repeat bidding at one time was not allowed.  However, an 
uproar by the bidders caused Copart to allow such bidding to be part of its current design.   13 
 
lasting under a minute, so that it is possible that bidders may accidentally bid against themselves 
(―tremble‖). This explanation is plausible for much of the repeat bidding at the New York site. 
There, most bidders who repeat-bid do so only once or twice in a weekly sale, and the most 
frequent do so on the order of only 10 to 20 times. The fraction of repeat bids is generally less 
than 2% of the bids. In Texas, however, the proportion of repeat bids is much higher, ranging 
from 18% to over 24%. Most buyers either do not repeat bid or do so only occasionally. 
However, some buyers bid against themselves several hundred times in one day (the maximum 
number of times we observe this  is 811!). 
The timing of the repeat bids may provide some explanation for them. Recall that if no new bid 
is received for two seconds, the message ―going once, two times, etc.‖ is given until a new bid is 
received or the sale ends if the time without a bid reaches 11 seconds.  Repeat bids occur with a 
longer lag,   with a longer time interval from the preceding bid, than other bids.  At a typical sale, 
the median time interval between repeat bids is six seconds  while it is only two seconds for the 
non-repeating bids.  Recall that reserve pries at Copart auctions are secret (that is, unknown by 
bidders when they choose their bids).   Recall that, if the bidding starts above the secret reserve 
price or goes above it during the bidding, a ―selling all the way‖ announcement is made  on the 
web site;  however, virtually all of the repeat bids take place below the reserve price. At the 
Texas site the proportion of bids that are repeats drops by more than half when the minimum bid 
is passed. The proportion of jump bids also drops, but by a lesser amount. This suggests that 
repeat bidding and, to a lesser extent, jump bidding, may be symptomatic of a kind of search 
behavior by which bidders try to discover the reserve price, but do not want to risk going over it.  
Another possibility is that some of the repeat bids are shills working with specific sellers. We 
have no robust statistical evidence for this story, but rather a colorful anecdote.  Namely, the 
individual buyer in Texas mentioned above who submitted 811 repeat-bids in one day was the 
high bidder (hence, ―won‖) 75 auctions over the course of two consecutive sales, but failed to 
obtain any of these cars – that is, in each of the 75 cases, the seller declined to sell the car to this 
individual.  This buyer certainly looked like a shill bidder. 14 
 
More broadly, however, we looked at the identities of the sellers whose vehicles had repeat bids, 
and we did not find any particular pattern.   Also, the frequent repeat bidders did not concentrate 
their bids on the vehicles of a few sellers. This suggests, but hardly proves, that the repeat 
bidders are simply hurrying things along, which is consistent with impatience as a primary 
motivating factor in these auctions.   While the auctions do move quickly, with most lasting 
under one minute, each weekday there are many of these auctions at sites all over North 
America, each with on order of 500 vehicles put up for bids. A bidder interested in one or more 
of the cars being sold must somehow manage to monitor the sale (or submit a maximum 
willingness to pay prior to the auction). Submitting jump bids or repeatedly clicking and, thus, 
raising your own bids, can be useful ways of hurrying things along.  Along these lines, this type 
of jump bidding decreases substantially once the secret reserve price is met.  
Regression results: testing intimidation vs. impatience  
Next, we discuss results from regressions to distinguish more narrowly between the intimidation 
versus impatience stories of jump bidding.   As we discussed before, the main empirical 
implication we focus on is that, if bidders jump to intimidate rivals, we should see a detrimental 
effect of jump bidding on sellers' revenues, while the opposite obtains if impatient bidders 
simply jump in order to ―speed up the clock‖ and end the auction sooner. 
The results from the lot-level regressions are shown in Table 5.   As controls, we included the 
car's odometer reading (―Odometer‖), a dummy for whether this reading represents the actual 
mileage (―Actual odometer‖), the number of bidders (―# buyers‖), the seller's estimated value 
(―seller book value‖), and dummies for the lane, week, and day of the week of the auction.  We 
did not include time (e.g. week or day) dummies for the New York yard as there was only one 
sale each week.  (We did experiment with various time trends and found no substantive changes 
in the results.) The main coefficients of interest are those on SMALLJUMP and LARGEJUMP 
which are, respectively, indicators for the 1,2,3 and 1,10,20 experimental treatments.   (The 
excluded category is when the increments are 1,5,10.) 15 
 
For the Texas sales, the regression results in Table 5 show that restrictions on jump-bidding have 
little effect on the high bids in the auctions. However, for the New York sales the coefficient of 
SMALL JUMP is positive and marginally significant, indicating that restricting jump-bidding 
increases slightly (by around $170) the high bid in the auctions.   This is consistent with the 
―jump-bidding as intimidation‖ hypothesis, and suggests that auctions are more competitive 
when jump-bidding is restricted, leading to higher potential revenue for the sellers.    The results 
are basically the same if the dependent variable is final sale price, conditional on being sold 
(columns B and D in Table 5 ). 
Confounding effects: seller strategic behavior.   The picture presented in the regressions so far 
is incomplete.   As we discussed before, due to the prevalent use of secret reserve prices, sellers 
are not required to sell the car at the high bid.   Table 6 presents some summary statistics 
describing seller behavior.   Obviously, we see that seller behavior varies substantially depending 
on whether the minimum bid (i.e., secret reserve price) is exceeded in the auction.   For the 
Texas sales, we see that when the final bid is below the minimum bid, sellers sell the car at the 
final bid only 40.7% of the time, and withdraw the car 36.3%.  When the final bid exceeds the 
minimum bid, however, sellers sell the car 85.4% of the time. The 14.6% no sales, even when 
the final bid exceeds the minimum bid arises from buyers reneging their winning bid.
17   When a 
buyer reneges, the seller can negotiate with the second highest bidder to sell the lot.  This results 
in sales 70% of the time.   Similar figures hold for the New York sales.   
Motivated by these numbers, we next consider regression specifications which jointly model the 
final sales prices along with the seller's decision of whether or not to sell the car.    Since the 
final sales prices is equal to zero for lots which the seller decides to withdraw, we augment the 
price regression with a second ―selection‖ equation which explains the seller's decision to sell 
(vs. withdraw) the car. Estimates from this augmented model – obtained using Heckman's two-
step method – are presented in Table 7 for, respectively, the Texas and New York sales.
18 
                                                       
17   Buyers that renege on their bid must pay a penalty. 
18  By estimating such a model, we allow for common unobservables – presumably unobserved 
characteristics of a car – which affect both the bids placed on the car as well as the sellers' decisions to 16 
 
The results from this specification are quite different from the results presented earlier.   
Specifically, for the Texas sales, we find that SMALLJUMP now has a negative and significant 
effect on the final sale price: restricting jump bidding reduces, on average, the final sales price by 
$816, not a small amount.   This is not consistent with the intimidation story, which would 
predict higher revenues for the seller when jump bidding is restricted, but rather with the 
impatience story.    
In the New York sales, however, we find that LARGEJUMP has a negative and significant effect 
on the final sales prices (implying a substantial $1,114 decrease in the prices on average).   This 
supports the intimidative bidding hypothesis.   Apparently, then, our evidence suggests that jump 
bidding may have an intimidation component in New York, but not in Texas. 
The selection equations, which explain whether a lot is sold at the high bid (vs. withdrawn or 
negotiated by the seller), are reported in Columns B and D in  Table 7.   Not surprisingly, the 
results here mirror those in Columns B and D in Table 5: we see that in Texas, SMALLJUMP 
also has a significantly negative effect on the propensity that a car is sold, but in New York, it is 
LARGEJUMP that has the significantly negative effect.    
Taken together, these results suggest some striking differences between the Texas and New York 
sales:  restricting jump bidding in Texas (resp. enhancing jump bidding in New York) tends to 
lower the high bids, which are less likely to attain the seller's minimum, and hence trigger the 
seller to either withdraw the car, or negotiate with the high bidder for a higher price.   In net, 
however, this compensating behavior of the seller is not enough to equalize revenue across the 
different treatments; the average revenue in auctions where jump bidding is restricted in Texas 
(resp. enhanced in New York) is still lower. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
withdraw the car.  The minimum bid plays the role of the instrument included in the selection equation, 
which is excluded from the price regression.   The validity of this instrument relies on an assumption that 
the minimum bid is not correlated with any other unobservables which may affect final prices (such as a 
seller's private information).  This is partly justified because, for the most part, the minimum bid is secret 
(unknown to bidders) , which lessens its direct effect on prices. 17 
 
Why are Texas and New York different?   The results here beg the question, as to what factors 
drive the difference in the results between the Texas and New York sales?   As mentioned above, 
an important difference between the two markets is the seller mix: specifically, car dealers are 
more prominent in the Texas market, accounting for around 45% of the cars sold, while dealers 
are account for only 10% of the cars sold in New York.   The other major group of sellers in 
these auctions are insurance companies, who are disposing of vehicles which have been 
―totaled‖; in both markets, insurance companies account for around 40% of the cars sold. 
A priori, one might expect dealers to behave more strategically; because they arguably have 
lower costs of holding inventory than insurance companies, they may be more inclined to use the 
particular institutions of the Copart auctions – such as the secret reserve prices and opportunities 
for renegotiation or withdrawing their cars – to their advantage.   We examine this hypothesis 
more formally; for a subset of the sales in both New York and Texas, we were able to obtain, in 
addition to the sellers‘ identity codes, their classification by types. In Table 8, we present the 
same type of figures as in the Table 6, but now broken down by lot sold by car dealers versus 
insurance companies.   The difference in seller behavior between these two groups is very 
striking.    First, across all sales, we see that insurance companies sell the majority (59%) of their 
cars at the high bid in the auction, and negotiate on only around 35% of sales.   Dealers sell only 
a quarter (24%) at the high bid, and negotiate around 30% of their sales.  Moreover, dealers 
withdraw (and presumably resell at a later date) 43% of their cars.  Grether and Plott (2009) 
observed similar behavior with dealers selling a substantially smaller fraction of vehicles brought 
to auctions than the large sellers (banks and finance companies in their data). 
Dealers are able to engage in such extensive negotiation and withdrawing behavior  by 
manipulating the secret reserve price.   We see that the high bid in the auction fails to exceed the 
minimum bid for about 76% (=1093/1430) of the cars sold by dealers, but only 24% of the time 
for cars sold by insurance companies.   Regressions (not reported) confirm that, indeed, 
controlling for car characteristics, dealers set minimum bids systematically higher than do 
insurance companies.  18 
 
The findings provide at least a partial reconciliation of the earlier regression results.   The greater 
dealer presence in the Texas sales, and their more strategic behavior, limit the scope and 
effectiveness of bidder strategies that reduce seller revenue.  That is, strategic sellers can 
counteract tendencies towards lower revenue by setting higher minimum bids and engaging in 
post-auction price negotiation.   At the same time, the longer duration of the Texas auctions may 
also lead to greater bidder impatience, so that restrictions in jump bidding (as in the 
SMALLJUMP treatments) lead to lower surplus and, therefore, lower seller revenue, which is 
what we find. 
The opposite is true in the New York sales.  Here, sellers are less strategic, so that enhanced 
opportunities to jump-bid (as in the LARGEJUMP treatments) may invite bidders to engage in 
intimidating behavior, leading to lower seller-revenue; this is what we find. 
Caveat: Non-monotonic effects of jumpsize on seller revenue.   We end our analysis with a 
caveat of sorts.   It is noteworthy that we find asymmetric and non-monotonic effects of the 
jump-bidding treatments on seller revenue in both markets.   That is, for Texas, we find that  
restricting the jumpsize (SMALLJUMP) reduces revenues relative to the baseline, but we don't 
find that, symmetrically, increasing the jumpsize (LARGEJUMP) increases revenues.   
Similarly, for New York, increasing the jumpsize (LARGEJUMP) reduces revenues, but 
decreasing the jumpsize (SMALLJUMP) doesn't increase revenues.   The revenue effects do not 
appear to be monotonic, at least in the range of jumpsizes which we consider in our experiments.   
This may suggest that, to a first-order, the baseline jumpsizes are close to optimal,  to 
maximizing expected seller revenue; hence, changes from the baseline either reduce revenue, or 
have no significant effect.    This interpretation may imply that perhaps treatments involving 
larger changes in jump sizes may be needed to better understand the effects of jump bidding 





In the literature on auctions, jump bidding has received substantial attention. Since jump bidding 
is frequently observed in practice, natural questions arise: why does it occur, and what are the 
revenue implications? Two of the leading explanations are (i) strategic signaling and 
intimidation; and (ii) impatience. In this paper we report the results of field experiments with the 
treatment variables being the sizes of allowed jump bids. One treatment restricted participants to 
smaller jump sizes than the company had been allowing, and the other increased the jump sizes. 
We analyzed data from 24 online auctions at which over 15,000 vehicles were auctioned.   
We find that behavior is much different at the two yards we examined.  In New York, where 
there are more insurance companies that just want to sell their inventory, there are fewer unsold 
lots by the sellers than in Texas.  In New York, our regressions show that enhanced opportunities 
to jump bidding lower revenue, which is consistent with the intimidation explanation.  However, 
in Texas, where there are many dealers offering cars but  selling a smaller fraction of them, the 
results show that restrictions on jump bidding lower revenue, which is consistent with the 
impatience explanation.  While our focus in this paper has been on bidder behavior, our results 
suggest that the interaction between the strategic behavior of both bidders and sellers is 
important in these auctions.  In ongoing work, we are conducting additional field experiments to 




























Lot Details and variable definitions 
Actual Cash Value  Estimated retail value of the lot as submitted to 
Copart by the seller. If the lot has been damaged, 
this is the value prior to the occurrence of the 
damage. The number is only informational. 
Repair Cost  Estimated cost to repair the vehicle as submitted 
to Copart by the seller of the vehicle. 
Title State/Type  Title type denotes the ownership documents that 
will be transferred to the buyer.  
Odometer  Odometer codes are shown to reflect the known 
reliability of the odometer reading. 
Primary Damage  Location of the major damage on the car 
Secondary Damage  Location of the minor damage on the car 
VIN  Vehicle Identification Number assigned by the 
manufacturer. 
Body Style  Body Style is the manufacturer's designation of 
the vehicle's configuration 
Color  Color listed on this site is the common color 
name that reasonably represents the exterior 
color of the vehicle.  
Engine  Engine is the motor  
Drive and Cylinders  Manufacturer's designation of the vehicle's 
power train. 
Fuel  Designates the fuel type used by the engine as 
designated by the VIN. 
Keys  Indicates whether Copart is in possession of the 





Minimum Bid Increments 
Bid Range  Minimum Increment 
$0 - $5  $1 
$5 - $40  $5 
$40 - $100  $10 
$100 - $1,000  $25 
$1,000 - $5,000  $50 
$5,000 - $25,000  $100 
$25,000 - $50,000  $250 
$50,000 - $100,000  $500 





Yard  Date  Treatment  # of Lots in Sample 
Texas  2/19/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  408 
Texas  2/23/10  1,2,3 (restricted)  497 
Texas  2/26/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  560 
Texas  3/2/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  490 
Texas  3/5/10  1,2,3 (restricted)  549 
Texas  4/20/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  515 
Texas  4/23/10  1,2,3 (restricted)  727 
Texas  4/27/10  1,2,3 (restricted)  486 
Texas  4/30/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  642 
New York  5/19/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  714 
Texas  5/25/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  689 
New York  5/26/10  1,2,3 (restricted)  658 
Texas  5/28/10  1,10,20 (enhanced)  689 
Texas  6/1/10  1,10,20 (enhanced)  538 
New York  6/2/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  586 
Texas  6/4/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  527 
New York  8/11/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  549 
Texas  8/17/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  613 
New York  8/18/10  1,10,20 (enhanced)  549 
Texas  8/20/10  1,10,20 (enhanced)  703 
Texas  8/24/10  1,10,20 (enhanced)  450 
New York  8/25/10  1,10,20 (enhanced)  551 
Texas  8/27/10  1,5,10 (benchmark)  746 




Average Bidding Behavior for each Yard/Lot/Treatment 

































































































Table 5 Regression results for New York and Texas Sales
19 













   (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
SMALLJUMP  0.1653  0.1596  0.1055  0.0389 
   (1.82)*  (1.73)*  (0.74)  (0.33) 
LARGEJUMP  0.0201  -0.0304  0.0660  0.0375 
   (0.21)  (0.31)  (0.57)  (0.41) 
Odometer  -0.004  -0.0063  0.0091  -0.018 
   (0.80)  (1.00)  (1.87)*  (4.81)*** 
Actual odometer  0.4256  0.3440  1.05  1.0041 
   (4.87)***  (3.85)***  (13.26)***  (16.98)*** 
#buyers  0.1655  0.1596  0.0511  0.0345 
   (8.05)***  (7.55)***  (3.27)***  (2.78)** 
Seller book value  0.2638  0.2679  0.3435  0.2717 
   (57.68)***  (55.63)***  (132.32)***  (92.03)*** 
Constant  -0.1298  1.697  0.391  1.3585 
   (0.20)  (2.12)**  (0.33)  (0.85) 
            
Week dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Day of week 
dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Make dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 











            
#observations  4170  3760  11499  8473 
       
                                                       
19   T-stats in parentheses.   ***: statistically significant at 1%, **: statistically significant at 5%; * statistically 
significant at 10%. 28 
 
Table 6 Seller Behavior 
       Texas            New York 
   # lots  %     # lots  % 
All lots:       All lots:      
Sell at high bid  6321  54.8  Sell at high bid  3269  78.1 
Negotiate price  2189  19  Negotiate price  505  12.1 
Withdraw  3026  26.2  Withdraw  410  9.8 
Total:  11536     Total:  4184    
               
Lots with high bid  
< minimum bid: 
Lots with high bid  
< minimum bid: 
Sell at high bid  3221  40.7  Sell at high bid  495  42.8 
Negotiate price  1818  23  Negotiate price  401  34.7 
Withdraw  2868  36.3  Withdraw  261  22.6 
Total:  7907     Total:  1157    
               
Lots with high bid  
> minimum bid: 
Lots with high bid  
> minimum bid: 
Sell at high bid  3100  85.4  Sell at high bid  2774  91.6 
Negotiate price  371  10.2  Negotiate price  104  3.4 
Withdraw  158  4.4  Withdraw  149  4.9 














Table 7 Heckman Selection Model results for New York and Texas Sales
20 
  New York  Yard  Texas   Yard 
Dependent 
variable:  Final sale price 
Pr(Final sale 
price>0)  Final sale price 
Pr(Final sale 
price>0) 
   (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
SMALLJUMP  0.5640  0.1364  -0.8404  -0.2488 
   (1.23)  (1.84)*  (2.39)**  (4.68)*** 
LARGEJUMP  -1.1092  -0.3685  0.0949  0.0499 
   (2.16)**  (5.48)***  (0.34)  (1.12) 
Odometer  -0.0427  -0.0050  0.0074  0.0071 
   (1.35)  (1.08)  (0.63)  (3.09)*** 
Actual odometer  0.5561  0.0547  1.3109  0.2207 
   (1.26)  (0.80)  (6.73)***  (7.16)*** 
#buyers  0.1475     0.1114   
   (1.43)     (2.95)**   
Seller book value  0.2795  0.0283  0.2142  0.0300 
   (11.95)***  (6.97)***  (23.89)***  (17.94)*** 
Constant  -2.335  1.3419  0.6248  -0.2210 
   (0.63)  (2.47)**  (0.12)  (0.49) 
Minimum bid     -0.0907    -0.1392 
      (10.53)***    (37.99)*** 
Selection term
21  12.0055     9.0027   
   (6.53)***     (27.95)***   
            
Week dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Day of week 
dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Make dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 











            
#observations  4170  4170  11499  11499 
   
 
                                                       
20  T-stats in parentheses.   ***: statistically significant at 1%, **: statistically significant at 5%; * statistically 
significant at 10%. 
21  Inverse Mill's ratio. 30 
 
Table 8 Seller Behavior: Car Dealers vs. Insurance companies 
       Car Dealers         Insurance Companies 
   # lots  %     # lots  % 
All lots:       All lots:      
Sell at high bid  343  24  Sell at high bid  3269  59 
Negotiate price  472  33  Negotiate price  505  36 
Withdraw  615  43  Withdraw  410  5 
Total:  1430     Total:  3215    
               
Lots with high bid  
< minimum bid: 
Lots with high bid  
< minimum bid: 
Sell at high bid  273  25  Sell at high bid  470  60 
Negotiate price  262  24  Negotiate price  228  29 
Withdraw  558  51  Withdraw  86  11 
Total:  1093     Total:  784    
               
Lots with high bid  
> minimum bid: 
Lots with high bid  
> minimum bid: 
Sell at high bid  67  20  Sell at high bid  1434  59 
Negotiate price  212  63  Negotiate price  924  38 
Withdraw  58  17  Withdraw  73  3 
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